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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a hierarchical game approach to model the energy efficiency maximization
problem where transmitters individually choose their channel assignment and power control. We conduct
a thorough analysis of the existence, uniqueness and characterization of the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Interestingly, we formally show that a spectrum orthogonalization naturally occurs when users decide
sequentially about their transmitting carriers and powers, delivering a binary channel assignment. Both
analytical and simulation results are provided for assessing and improving the performances in terms
of energy efficiency and spectrum utilization between the simultaneous-move game (with synchronous
decision makers), the social welfare (in a centralized manner) and the proposed Stackelberg (hierarchical)
game. For the first time, we provide tight closed-form bounds on the spectral efficiency of such a model,
including correlation across carriers and users. We show that the spectrum orthogonalization capability
induced by the proposed hierarchical game model enables the wireless network to achieve the spectral
efficiency improvement while still enjoying a high energy efficiency.
Index Terms
Energy efficiency; spectral efficiency; multi-carrier system; spectrum orthogonalization; game theory;
Stackelberg equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ecological concerns are steadily attracting more and more attention in wireless communications
[1], [2]. From the operators’ perspective, energy efficiency not only has great ecological benefits
and represents social responsibility in fighting climate change, but also has significant economic
benefits. Therefore, innovative solutions that support traffic increase and maintain a limited energy
2consumption need to be considered at both system and device levels in order to address environ-
mental and operational costs. Recently, Cisco systems have pointed out that the global mobile data
traffic will increase nearly tenfold between 2014 and 2019, giving incentive for service providers to
reduce their OpEx by reducing their energy consumption [3]. This suggests to shift from pursuing
optimal capacity and spectral efficiency to efficient energy usage when designing wireless networks.
Indeed, spectral efficiency has been a traditional requirement of wireless architectures, especially
when their access is limited to scarce spectrum. As a result, recent trends in mobile client access
tend to support both spectral and energy efficiency at the same time while addressing a wide
variety of delay and throughput objectives [4].
CONTRIBUTIONS
To address these crucial issues among others, we propose to study energy efficient wireless
networks in which we introduce a degree of hierarchy among users. More specifically, we consider
energy efficient multi-carrier wireless networks that can be modeled by a decentralized multiple
access channel. The network is said to be decentralized in the sense that each user can freely
choose his power control policy and carrier assignment in order to selfishly maximize a certain
individual performance criterion, called utility (or payoff) in the context of game theoretic studies.
We formally prove that the hierarchical structure of the game naturally leads to a spectrum
orthogonalization pattern where the components of the network have incentive to transmit on dif-
ferent carriers. This orthogonalization feature across the multiple interfering devices is particularly
appealing, not only from an interworking perspective (as a result of reduced infrastructure), but
also for increasing both network coverage and data capacity without the need to split the available
spectrum. In this sense, we prove that the advantage of the hierarchical (Stackelberg) model that
we propose over the simultaneous-move model in [5] is rather significant.
One could wonder that, as soon as the number of carriers is high, interference can be avoided
with high probability. We show next that users still experience interference even when the number
of carriers to number of users ratio exceeds a few units, especially for synchronous decision
makers. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, performance bounds have never been derived in
the multiple carrier context. This allows us to provide tight closed-form bounds on the spectral
efficiency of such a model. We formally prove that the spectrum orthogonalization capability
induced by the proposed hierarchical game model enables the wireless network to achieve the
spectral efficiency improvement while still enjoying a high energy efficiency. In particular, we
show that the orthogonalization feature makes correlation over carriers suitable for energy efficient
systems as it brings more orthogonalization over the system (and thus leads to higher spectral
efficiency), while correlation over users is not suited as it degrades the spectral efficiency.
3RELATED LITERATURE AND NOVELTY OF THE WORK
To reduce the network energy consumption, [6] proposed an optimal traffic aware scheme using
an online stochastic game theoretic algorithm. In [7], authors proposed a joint transmitter and
receiver optimization for the energy efficiency in orthogonal frequency-division multiple-access
(OFDMA) systems. Energy efficient power control game has been first proposed by Goodman et
al. in [8] for flat fading channels and re-used by [5] for multi-carrier systems. [9] proposed an
energy efficient topology control game for wireless ad hoc networks in the presence of selfish
nodes. All these works do not consider hierarchy among different actors in the system. However,
as mentioned in [8] the Nash equilibrium in such games can be very energy inefficient. Note that
the Stackelberg formulation arises naturally in many context of practical interest. For example, the
hierarchy is inherent to cognitive radio networks (CRNs) where the user with the higher priority
(i.e., the leader or the primary user (PU)) transmits first, then the user with the lower priority
(i.e., the follower or the secondary user (SU)) transmits after sensing the spectral environment
[10]–[12]. This is also a natural setting for heterogeneous wireless networks due to the absence
of coordination among the small cells, and between small cells and macro cells [13]–[15]. There
have been many works on Stackelberg games [16]–[18], but they do not consider energy efficiency
for the individual utility as defined in [8]. They rather consider transmission rate-type utilities (see
e.g., [19], [20]).
In a prior work [21], we proposed a hierarchical game theoretic model for two-user–two-carrier
energy efficient wireless systems. It was shown that, for the vast majority of cases, users choose
their transmitting carriers in such a way that if the leader transmits on a given carrier, the follower
has incentive to choose the other carrier. One major motivation of this paper is to extend the original
problem in [21] to some general models that can be widely used in practice by considering an
arbitrary number of carriers.
The work that is most closely related to ours is [22], where the hierarchical game was for-
mulated for the energy efficiency maximization problem in the single carrier system. Notably, it
has been proved that, when only one carrier is available for the players, there exists a unique
Stackelberg equilibrium. However, multi-carrier systems have gained intense interest in wireless
communications, making the use of multi-carrier transmissions much more appealing for future
wireless systems, such as LTE. In fact, the multi-dimensional nature of such a problem along with
the physical properties of the transmission phenomenon make the extension to an arbitrary number
of carriers problem much more challenging than the single carrier model. We will see later in the
paper that, contrary to [22], we show that, when we come up to study multi-carrier hierarchical
games, the degree of freedom increases and leading becomes better than following. This means
that a player can often take advantage of playing first (as the leader), but not always. Indeed, if
4the players are in the same conditions, a player can improve his utility by playing after observing
the action of the other player.
In the light of the above, the paper is structured as follows. The general system model is
presented in Sec. II. Sec. III reviews the simultaneous-move game and presents the hierarchical
game problem. Then, in Sec. IV, we characterize the Stackelberg equilibrium, and we evaluate the
performance of the Stackelberg approach in Sec. V. Sec. VI provides numerical results to illustrate
and validate the theoretical findings derived in the previous sections. Additional comments and
conclusions are provided in Sec. VII.
II. ENERGY EFFICIENT WIRELESS NETWORK MODEL
We consider a wireless network, in which mobile users access to the spectrum in an asynchronous
way. We assume that the overall bandwidth can be divided into an arbitrary number of narrow-band
carriers (K ≥ 2), and that the carriers are narrow enough to undergo flat fading. Let us further
suppose that the channels are quasi-static flat fading, i.e., the channel gains are constant during
each frame but may change from one frame to the next.
Without the constraint of exclusive assignment of each carrier for users, we generally formulate
the problem of energy efficiency maximization by allowing that a carrier could be shared by
multiple users. One can think of heterogeneous networks (HetNets) or ultra-dense networks (UDNs)
composed of different cellular layers and multiple access technologies. In order to improve the
efficiency of spectrum use, multiple overlapping networks operate on the same frequency bands,
causing (co-channel) interference, which, in turn, can cause harmful throughput degradation. To
be specific, in the following, we will consider a decentralized multiple access channel composed
of a leader – indexed by 1, having the priority to access the medium, and a follower – indexed
by 2 that accesses the medium after observing the action of the leader. This setting is particularly
relevant for CRNs with the PU as the leader and the SU as the follower, with the difference that
no guarantee of service to the PU is considered while sharing the spectrum with the SU. It is
also suited for sparse mobile networks in which one may neglect the possibility of simultaneous
interference of more than two users. An extension of the proposed model to multiple users with
multi-hierarchical levels can be found in [23], where two nearly-optimal algorithms that ensure
complete spectrum orthogonalization across users were proposed. Notice that closed-form solutions
for the multi-user hierarchical game is in general very difficult to obtain.
Accordingly, for any user n ∈ {1, 2} and m 6= n, the received signal-to-noise plus interference
ratio (SINR) is expressed as
γkn =
gknp
k
n
σ2 + gkmp
k
m
:= pknĥ
k
n; for k = 1, . . . ,K (1)
5We will call ĥkn the effective channel gain, defined as the ratio between the SINR and the trans-
mission power of the other users over the kth carrier. gkn and pkn are resp. the fading channel gain
and the transmitted power of user n transmitting on carrier k, whereas σ2 stands for the variance
of the Gaussian noise. We statistically model the channel gains gkn to be independent identically
distributed (i.i.d.) over the fading coefficients. It follows from the above SINR expression that the
strategy chosen by a user affects the performance of other users in the network through multiple-
access interference.
The system model adopted throughout the paper is based on the seminal paper [8] that defines
the energy efficiency framework. In order to formulate the power control problem as a game,
we first need to define a utility function suitable for data applications. Let us first define the
“efficiency" function f(·), which measures the packet success rate. In brief, when SINR is very
low, data transmission results in massive errors and the goodput (rate conditioned to errors) tends to
0; when SINR is very high, data transmission becomes error-free and the rate grows asymptotically
to a constant. However, achieving a high SINR level requires the user terminal to transmit at a
high power, which in turn results in low battery life. This phenomenon is concisely captured by
an increasing, continuous and S-shaped “efficiency" function f(·). A more detailed discussion of
the efficiency function can be found in [24]–[26]. The following utility function allows one to
measure the corresponding tradeoff between the transmission benefit (total goodput over the K
carriers) and cost (total power over the K carriers):
un(p1,p2) =
Rn ·
K∑
k=1
f(γkn)
K∑
k=1
pkn
, (2)
where Rn is the transmission data rate of user n and pn is the power allocation vector of user n
over all carriers, i.e., pn = (p1n, . . . , pKn ). The quantity Rn can be viewed as the gross (transmission)
data rate on the radio interface which only depends on the user’s application/service induced by
high layers such as the transport and the application layers. This target rate may depend on the
type of application, but not on the physical layer or the wireless environment of the user. The
utility function un, that has bits per Joule as units, perfectly captures the tradeoff between goodput
and battery life, and is particularly suitable for applications where energy efficiency is crucial.
III. THE GAME THEORETIC FORMULATION
One proposal for designing spectrum sharing is through game theory which offers basis to model
interactions between interacting users and develop decentralized and/or distributed algorithms for
resource allocation.
6A. The simultaneous-move game problem
The interaction between users can be modeled through a non-cooperative game where each user
maximizes his energy efficiency subject to interference constraints, given adversarial decisions.
An important solution concept of the game under consideration is the Nash equilibrium, which is
a fundamental concept in the strategic games. It is a vector of strategies (referred to hereafter and
interchangeably as actions), one for each player, pNE = {p1NE,p2NE} such that no player has
incentive to unilaterally change his strategy.
Definition 1. A strategy vector pNE = {p1NE,p2NE} is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) if and only if:
∀p1 6= p1NE , u1(p1NE ,p2NE) ≥ u1(p1,p2NE)
and
∀p2 6= p2NE , u2(p1NE ,p2NE) ≥ u2(p1NE ,p2).
In what follows, we define a less robust stable strategy vector for non-cooperative games in
which the Nash equilibrium is a too strong concept. If there exists an ǫ > 0 such that1 (1 +
ǫ)un(pn
ǫNE ,pǫNE−n ) ≥ un(pn,p−nǫNE) for every action pn 6= pnǫNE, we say that the vector
p
ǫNE = {p1ǫNE,p2ǫNE} is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
The Nash equilibrium concept assumes that the players decide simultaneously. One important
framework of non-cooperative games is to assume that one player can observe the decision of the
other player before deciding. This concept can be related to asymmetric information/decision in
non-cooperative games and is related to the concept of Stackelberg equilibrium.
B. The hierarchical game problem
Hierarchical models in wireless networks are motivated by the idea that the utility of the leader
obtained at the Stackelberg equilibrium can often be improved over his utility obtained at the
Nash equilibrium when the two users play simultaneously [17]. It has been proved, in [22], that
when only one carrier is available for the players, there exists a unique Stackelberg equilibrium in
which both the leader and the follower improve their utilities. The goal is then to find a Stackelberg
equilibrium in this bi-level game [27].
In this work, we consider a Stackelberg game framework in which, a foresighted follower adapts
his power allocation vector p2, based on the power vector of the leader p1 chosen in advance. The
power allocation of the shortsighted leader will re-embody in the form of interference introduced to
the foresighted follower as given by Eq. (2). At the core lies the idea that, the foresighted follower
1The −n subscript on vector p stands for “except user n".
7will extract the useful asymmetry information in order to make more efficient hierarchical decision
making.
Definition 2. (Stackelberg equilibrium):
A vector of actions p˜ = (p˜1, p˜2) = (p˜11, . . . , p˜K1 , p˜12, . . . , p˜K2 ) is called Stackelberg equilibrium if
and only if:
p˜1 ∈ argmax
p1
u1(p1, p2(p1)),
where for all p1, we have
p2(p1) ∈ argmax
p2
u2(p1,p2),
and p˜2 = p2(p˜1).
Remark 1. Note that, for sake of clarity, we will only consider the most interesting (and non-trivial)
regime where the transmit powers are less than maximal power levels. However, all the results
can be easily extended to the case of finite powers.
IV. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM
We first determine the best-response function of the follower depending on the action of the
leader. This approach is similar to backward induction technique. This result comes directly from
Proposition 1 of [5]. For making this paper sufficiently self-contained, we review here the latter
proposition.
Proposition 1 (Given in [5]). Given the power allocation vector p1 of the leader, the best-response
of the follower is given by
pk2(p1) =


γ∗(σ2 + gk1p
k
1)
gk2
, for k = L2(p1)
0, for all k 6= L2(p1)
(3)
with L2(p1) = argmax
k
ĥk2(p
k
1) and γ∗ is the unique (positive) solution of the first order equation
x f ′(x) = f(x) (4)
Note that Eq. (4) has a unique solution if the efficiency function f(·) is sigmoidal [28]. The
last proposition says that the best-response of the follower is to use only one carrier, the one such
that the effective channel gain is the best.
Let us first present a useful result that will allow us to reduce the complexity of the original
problem (with K carriers) to a simpler one where we only focus on the two best carriers.
Proposition 2. Denote by B1 and S1 two carriers for the leader for which gk1 is the highest and
the second highest respectively, while by B2 and S2 the ones with two highest gk2 (that is, for the
8follower). If the Stackelberg game has an equilibrium, then it has an equilibrium where the leader
transmits on one of the carriers {B1, S1}, while the follower transmits on one of the carriers
{B2, S2}.
For the clarity of the exposition, all the propositions are proven in the Appendix.
Given this result, we may only concentrate on strategies where each of the players uses one of
his two best carriers. The proposition below gives the algorithm to compute the equilibrium power
allocations for both players. Before the proposition, we introduce additional notation, namely
γˆ =
gB22 − gS22
gS22
.
Proposition 3. If B1 6= B2 then equilibrium power allocation of each of the players is
pkn =


γ∗σ2
gkn
when k = Bn
0 otherwise
If B1 = B2 then the equilibrium power allocations of the players are computed in three steps:
1) If γˆ ≤ γ∗ then equilibrium power allocation of the leader is
pk1 =


γ∗σ2
gk1
when k = B1
0 otherwise
and that of the follower is
pk2 =


γ∗σ2
gk2
when k = S2
0 otherwise
Otherwise, go to steps 2 and 3.
2) Find all the solutions x ≤ γˆ
1+γ∗(1+γˆ)
to the equation
(x− x2γ∗)f ′(x) = f(x) (5)
If there are solutions different than x = 0, choose the one for which f(x)(1−xγ∗)
x
is the highest.
Let β∗ be this solution.
3) Compare four values2:
VB1 =
f(β∗)(1− γ∗β∗)gB11 R1
β∗σ2(1 + γ∗)
, WB1 =
f(γˆ)gB11 R1
γˆσ2
,
US1 =
f(γ∗)gS11 R1
γ∗σ2
, V 0B1 = f
′(0)
gB11 R1
σ2(1 + γ∗)
.
If VB1 is the greatest, then equilibrium power allocations of the leader and the follower are
pk1 =


β∗(1+γ∗)σ2
gk1 (1−γ∗β∗)
when k = B1
0 otherwise
2Of course V can only be computed if β∗ exists.
9and
pk2 =


γ∗(1+β∗)σ2
gk2 (1−γ∗β∗)
when k = B2
0 otherwise
Next, if WB1 is the greatest, then equilibrium power allocations of the leader and the follower
are
pk1 =


γˆσ2
gk1
when k = B1
0 otherwise
and
pk2 =


γ∗σ2
gk2
when k = S2
0 otherwise
If US1 is the greatest, then equilibrium power allocation of the leader is
pk1 =


γ∗σ2
gk1
when k = S1
0 otherwise
and that of the follower is
pk2 =


γ∗σ2
gk2
when k = B2
0 otherwise
Finally, if V 0B1 is (the only) greatest, then the game has no equilibrium.
While the formulation of Prop. 3 is rather complicated, it can be explained in a simpler manner.
It describes essentially the way the choice is made by the leader (the follower adjusts to it according
to Prop. 1). If the best carrier of the leader is different than that of the follower, he transmits on
his best carrier with power corresponding to SINR γ∗. If their best carriers are the same, the leader
tries to optimize his power on his best carrier B1, by choosing between two powers corresponding
to two values of SINR: β∗, which gives the highest value of the leader’s utility if the follower
transmits on the same carrier as the leader, creating interference, or γˆ, which is the smallest value
of SINR forcing the follower to change his carrier and reduce the interference on B1. If he can
obtain a better utility than the best of the two on some other carrier S1, he chooses to transmit
there with the power corresponding to γ∗.
Remark 2. Note that the equilibria computed Prop. 3 are unique as long as channel gains for
different carriers are different and as long as VB1 6= WB1 6= US1 . Also the response of the follower
at equilibrium is unique as long as channel gains for different carriers are different and WB1 is not
the greatest value in step 3) of the algorithm described by the theorem3. The matter of uniqueness
3Note that, in case there are multiple equilibria, because VB1 = US1 > WB1 , the response of the follower to both equilibrium
strategies of the leader is unique.
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of the follower’s response is obviously very important, as in case there are multiple best responses
to an equilibrium strategy of the leader, the follower has no incentive to follow his equilibrium
policy. In our case the equilibrium strategy can be imposed to the follower when he has multiple
best responses to the leader’s policy by using a simple trick: whenever WB1 appears to be the
greatest in step 3), the leader has to use power infinitesimally smaller than that prescribed by his
equilibrium policy. This gives him a minimally smaller utility, but at the same time makes the
best response of the follower unique.
Remark 3. The reasoning behind Prop. 2 works also for the model where powers that players can
use are limited to the sets [0, Pmax], so also in this case each player transmits on only one of his
two best carriers. Prop. 3 gives the form of a Stackelberg equilibrium in case each user has enough
power in [0, Pmax] to reach the SINR γ∗. Otherwise, it can be shown that all the computations of
Prop. 3 can be repeated under assumption that whenever the desired value of the SINR cannot be
reached within the constrained regime, the users transmit at their maximum power. In that way
we also obtain an equilibrium in the model. However, considering power constraints will induce
additional cases where the equilibrium is such that some users transmit with their maximum power
Pmax, complicating the formulation of the results, without changing their general sense.
The next proposition characterizes the degenerate case when there is no equilibrium in the
Stackelberg game.
Proposition 4. The Stackelberg game has no equilibrium iff B1 = B2, γˆ > γ∗ and
f ′(0) > max
{
f(γˆ)(1+γ∗)
γˆ
, f(γ
∗)(1+γ∗)
γ∗
g
S1
1
g
B1
1
, f(β
∗)(1−γ∗β∗)
β∗
}
, (6)
but for any ǫ > 0 there are ǫ-equilibria of the form
pk1(ǫ) =

 α(ǫ) when k = B10 otherwise
for the leader and
pk2(ǫ) =


γ∗(σ2+gk1α(ǫ))
gk2
when k = B2
0 otherwise
for the follower, where α(ǫ) is an arbitrarily small value, guaranteeing that the utility of the leader
is within ǫ from V 0B1 .
Remark 4. It is important to notice that the case considered in Proposition 4 is indeed possible
for some sigmoidal function f . One example of such f is one of the form:
f(x) =


1√
1−x − 1; x ≤ 34
7+
√
17
4
− 13+3
√
17
32x+2
√
17−18 ; x ≥ 34
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One can check that f is concave on interval [0, 3
4
] and convex on [3
4
,∞). Moreover, f and f ′ are
continuous and limx→∞ f(x) = 7+
√
17
4
, so it is definitely a sigmoidal function. It is straightforward
to compute that γ∗ = 1 for this function. Unfortunately, Equation (5) has no solutions on (0,∞),
which can be computed either numerically or using Taylor expansion of the function
√
1− x.
Finally, f ′(0) = 1
2
, and so for gB22 ≫ gS22 and gB11 ≫ gS11 , the inequality (6) will be satisfied.
On the other hand, any of the two following assumptions:
(A1) f ′(0+) = 0,
(A2) f ′(0+) > 0 and f ′′(0+)
f ′(0
+)
> 2γ∗,
implies that (6) is never satisfied, and so the game under consideration always has an equilibrium.
In particular, for the most standard form of f [5],
f(x) = (1− e−x)M , M > 1
not only there always exists an equilibrium in the Stackelberg model (because f satisfies (A1)),
but also the procedure in Proposition 3 slightly simplifies, as:
1) Eq. (4) can be written as Mx = ex − 1,
2) Eq. (5) can be written as M(x − x2γ∗) = ex − 1, moreover it has exactly one positive
solution.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section is dedicated to present some key properties and performances of the Stackelberg
equilibrium we derived in the previous section. We first study the individual performance of each
player. Then, we evaluate the global performance of the system in terms of energy efficiency and
spectral efficiency.
A. Individual Performance Evaluation
1) Spectrum orthogonalization: In this section, we shall first look for what values of channel
gains for each of the users there is a possibility that both the leader and the follower transmit on
the same carrier. In the sequel, we will refer to the case where users transmit on the same carrier
as there is no orthogonalization between users, i.e., ∃ k | pkn 6= 0 for n = {1, 2}. Then, we will
compute the probability that there is no orthogonalization between the players.
Proposition 5. The set of {g1n, . . . , gKn }, n = 1, 2 for which there is no orthogonalization between
users is a proper subset of the set G0 of gkns satisfying
B1 = B2 and gBnn ≥ (1 + γ∗)gSnn ; for n = 1, 2. (7)
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Note that G0 is exactly the set of gk1s for which there is no orthogonalization in the simultaneous-
move game considered in [5]. Thus, introducing hierarchy in the game induces more spectrum
orthogonalization than there was in the simultaneous-move scenario.
In the next proposition, we will show that the probability of no orthogonalization between the
players is always small and decreases fast as the number of carriers grows.
Proposition 6. Assume that the channel gains for different carriers of each of the users are i.i.d.
Rayleigh random variables. Then, the probability that there is no orthogonalization between the
players at the Stackelberg equilibrium is bounded above by
(1 + γ∗)B(1 + γ∗, K)
[
K − 1
K
+ (1 + γ∗)B(1 + γ∗, K)
]
∼ O(K−(1+γ∗)) (8)
where B denotes the Beta function, which is the exact probability of no orthogonalization in the
simultaneous-move version of the model.
Remark 5. In the above proposition, we suppose that the channel gains of different players are
not correlated, which is typically the case when carriers are far enough [29]. Otherwise, the
probability computed there can be treated as an upper bound for respective probabilities, when
there is a positive correlation between different carriers of each of the users, which is much more
realistic. We will see later in the paper (see Fig. 1 and 2) that, in the case of positive correlation
over carriers, these probabilities will be even smaller (and so faster decreasing to 0).
Remark 6. Now, the opposite situation to that analyzed in Prop. 6 is when both users experience
the same channel gains. The probability that there is no orthogonalization between the players in
the Stackelberg game is then bounded above by
K(1 + γ∗)B(1 + γ∗, K) (9)
which is still decreasing to 0 as K goes to infinity, but K times bigger than the bound in Eq.
(8). The intuition behind this is that, if the channels of different users are not correlated, then
with probability (K − 1)/K users have different best channels and with only 1/K users have the
same best channels (and interference is an issue in this case). If users experience the same channel
gains, they have the same best channel with probability 1. Also, if the number of carriers K is
big, both users will have two best carriers of similar quality as the channel gains are chosen at
random, so the probability that they choose the same carrier becomes very small (see Fig. 3 and
4).
2) Payoffs comparison: The leader is not worse off on introducing hierarchy (which is always
the case in Stackelberg games if both the leader and the follower use their equilibrium policies),
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but the follower loses on it in some cases. The proposition below gives more insights on what the
latter depends on.
Proposition 7. For any sigmoidal function f the following three situations are possible:
1) B1 6= B2. Then, for both players, the payoff in the Stackelberg game is the same as that in
the simultaneous-move game.
2) Both players use the same carrier B1 = B2 in equilibria (or ǫ-equilibria) of simultaneous-
move and Stackelberg games. Then, the payoff of the follower in the Stackelberg game is
always bigger than what he receives in the simultaneous-move game.
3) B1 = B2 and both players use different carriers in equilibria of simultaneous-move and
Stackelberg games: the leader in the Stackelberg game uses B1, but in the simultaneous-
move game he uses S1 in equilibrium, the follower in the Stackelberg game uses S2, while
in the simultaneous-move game he uses B2 in equilibrium. Then, the payoff of the follower
in the Stackelberg game is smaller than what he receives in simultaneous-move game.
3) Comparison between leading and following: It is known from [22], that if there is only one
carrier available for the players, it is always better to be the follower than to be the leader. The
situation changes when the number of carriers increases.
Proposition 8. Suppose that the Stackelberg game has exact equilibria both when player 1 is the
leader and when he is the follower. Then, the utility at Stackelberg equilibrium of player 1 if he
is the leader is not less than his utility if he is the follower if one of the following conditions is
satisfied:
1) B1 6= B2.
2) B1 = B2 and min{ g
B1
1
g
S1
1
,
g
B2
2
g
S2
2
} ≤ 1 + γ∗
3) B1 = B2 and for i = 1, 2, j 6= i,
f
(
g
Bi
i
g
Si
i
− 1
)
g
Bi
i
g
Si
i
− 1
≥ max


f(γ∗)g
Sj
j
γ∗g
Bj
j
,
f(β∗)(1− γ∗β∗)
β∗(1 + γ∗)


4) B1 = B2,
f(β∗)(1− γ∗β∗)
β∗(1 + γ∗)
≥ max


f(γ∗)gS11
γ∗g
B1
1
,
f
(
g
B2
2
g
S2
2
− 1
)
g
B2
2
g
S2
2
− 1


and
f
(
g
B1
1
g
S1
1
− 1
)
g
B1
1
g
S1
1
− 1
≥ max
{
f(γ∗)gS22
γ∗g
B2
2
,
f(β∗)(1 − γ∗β∗)
β∗(1 + γ∗)
}
5) B1 = B2,
f(γ∗)gS11
γ∗g
B1
1
≥ max


f
(
g
B2
2
g
S2
2
− 1
)
g
B2
2
g
S2
2
− 1
,
f(β∗)(1 − γ∗β∗)
β∗(1 + γ∗)


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f(β∗)(1− γ∗β∗)
β∗(1 + γ∗)
≥ max


f(γ∗)gS22
γ∗g
B2
2
,
f
(
g
B1
1
g
S1
1
− 1
)
g
B1
1
g
S1
1
− 1


and
g
B1
1
g
S1
1
≤ 1 + β
∗
1− γ∗β∗
6) B1 = B2,
f
(
g
B2
2
g
S2
2
− 1
)
g
B2
2
g
S2
2
− 1
≥ max
{
f(γ∗)gS11
γ∗g
B1
1
,
f(γ∗)(1 − γ∗β∗)
γ∗(1 + γ∗)
}
and
f(β∗)(1− γ∗β∗)
β∗(1 + γ∗)
≥ max


f(γ∗)gS22
γ∗g
B2
2
,
f
(
g
B1
1
g
S1
1
− 1
)
g
B1
1
g
S1
1
− 1


Although the formulation of the proposition is rather complicated, its general meaning is simple.
It states that, in most of the cases, different users have different best carriers, so there is no
difference between leading and following. The two remaining cases are when both players have
the same best carrier. In the first one, each of the players has only one good carrier and the
same for both. This situation reduces to the problem considered in [22] where only one carrier
is available, and so every user can obtain better energy efficient utility by decreasing its priority
from leading to following. The reason behind this phenomenon is basically the construction of
the energy-efficient utility. In the simultaneous-move version of this model each user transmits
with the power corresponding to the SINR γ∗. Under Stackelberg regime, the leader can increase
his utility by reducing his power consumption to the level corresponding to the SINR β∗ < γ∗,
which reduces the overconsumption due to interference. The optimal answer of the follower will
still be to use the power giving him the SINR of γ∗ though. The result of the shift in the power
used by the leader without a similar change in that of the follower is that both utilities increase
simultaneously, but the increase of the utility of the follower is bigger than that of the leader. In
the second case, both players have the same best carrier but one of them prefers to use his second
best carrier instead (that is – the second best carrier is not much worse than the best one). In this
situation, it is the leader who is better off on introducing hierarchy, so this becomes similar to
most of the Stackelberg models4. It is worth noting though that if gkn are i.i.d. Rayleigh random
variables, one of the two first cases of Proposition 8 will occur with probability significantly bigger
than 1 − (1 + γ∗)B(1 + γ∗, K) [K−1
K
+ (1 + γ∗)B(1 + γ∗, K)], and so it will be very close to 1
even for small values of K. We will show later in the paper (see Figure 9) that, in practice, it is
the last situation that prevails whenever the players have at least two carriers at their disposal.
4Notice that in basic standard economic problems, it is commonly known that a firm does always better by preempting the
market and setting its output level first (e.g., in Cournot-like competition games) [30].
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B. System Performance Evaluation
1) Energy efficiency: Let us now compute the social welfare in our model, defined as the sum
of utilities of both players. In the following proposition, we give upper bounds on the possible
decrease of social welfare when we introduce hierarchy in the game, as well as a bound on the
ratio of the maximum social welfare obtainable and that of Stackelberg equilibrium in the game.
The latter can be treated as the price of anarchy [31] in our game.
Proposition 9. The social welfare when the players apply Stackelberg equilibrium policies equals
both maximum social welfare obtainable in the game and social welfare in Nash equilibrium of
the simultaneous-move game whenever B1 6= B2. When B1 = B2, the social welfare in Stackelberg
equilibrium:
1) Is at most R1g
B1
1 +R2g
B2
2
R1g
B1
1 +R2g
S2
2
times worse than that in simultaneous-move game equilibrium.
2) Is at most R1g
B1
1 +R2g
B2
2
R1g
S1
1 +R2g
S2
2
times worse than the maximum social welfare obtainable in the game.
Note that, when gkn are i.i.d. Rayleigh variables (as assumed in Proposition 6), then a) the
region where Stackelberg equilibrium is not the social optimum shrinks fast as the number of
carriers increases; b) even in case there is no orthogonalization in Stackelberg equilibrium, the
ratios appearing in the above proposition are small with probability increasing with the number
of carriers.
2) Spectral efficiency: Along with energy efficiency, spectral efficiency – defined as the through-
put per unit of bandwidth – is one of the key performance evaluation criteria for wireless network
design. These two conflicting criteria can be linked through their tradeoff [32], [33]. Therefore,
it is often imperative to make a tradeoff between energy efficiency and spectral efficiency. In the
following, we give a closed-form expression of the lower bound on the sum spectral efficiency of
the proposed Stackelberg model.
Proposition 10. The spectral efficiency in case there is a orthogonalization between the users at
the Stackelberg equilibrium is strictly bigger than
log2(1 + γ
∗)
[
1 − (1 + γ∗)B(1 + γ∗, K) ·
(
K − 1
K
+ (1 + γ∗)B(1 + γ∗, K)
)]
(10)
which is equal to the spectral efficiency in the simultaneous-move game.
The computation done in Proposition 10 holds in case there is orthogonalization between the
players. This means that this is only a lower bound for the total spectral efficiency in our model.
However, by Proposition 6, it becomes very tight as K goes to infinity. An easy consequence
of this is that the spectral efficiency in the limit model (with an infinite number of carriers) can
be computed exactly, and is equal to log2(1 + γ∗). Notice that, when users experience the same
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Fig. 1. The probability of no orthogonalization between the players at the Nash equilibrium with correlation over carriers.
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Fig. 2. The probability of no orthogonalization between the players at the Stackelberg equilibrium with correlation over carriers.
Rayleigh channel gains, the spectral efficiency in case there is a orthogonalization between the
users at the Stackelberg equilibrium is strictly bigger than
log2(1 + γ
∗) [1−K(1 + γ∗)B(1 + γ∗, K)] (11)
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
We consider the energy efficiency function, f(x) = (1−e−x)M , well-known in power allocation
games, where M = 100 is the block length in bits. For this efficiency function, γ∗ ≃ 6.4 (or 8.1
dB). Simulations were carried out using a rate Rn = 1 bps for n = {1, 2}. We have simulated
10000 scenarios to remove the random effects from Rayleigh fading.
A. The probability of no orthogonalization
Let us first consider a quasi-static correlated Rayleigh-fading channel model. Fig. 1 and 2
reflect the effect of the correlation over carriers (i.e., the correlation between different carriers of
each of the users) on the probability of no orthogonalization for the simultaneous (Nash) and the
hierarchical (Stackelberg) game respectively. The correlation model follows the model in [34]. As
we expected in Section V-A1 (see Remark 4), results show that, in the case of correlated carriers,
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the probability of no orthogonalization is smaller and so faster decreasing to 0 even for a moderate
number of carriers K.
From now on, we will only consider the case of no correlation between different carriers of
each of the users. In case of correlated carriers, performance results obtained in the remainder
have to be considered as a worst case performance.
Fig. 3 and 4 investigate the effect of the correlation over users (i.e., the correlation between
different users’ fading channel) on the probability of no orthogonalization for the Nash and the
Stackelberg game respectively. The correlation factor modeling the dependencies between the
users is θ. In both figures, results show that, as the correlation between different users decreases,
the probability of no orthogonalization gets even smaller and so faster decreasing to 0, which
corresponds to what Remark 5 claims. In order to assess the accuracy of the theoretical bounds,
we also compare the simulated probability of no orthogonalization with the theoretical upper-
bounds. More specifically, for i.i.d. users, we compare theoretical curve derived in Eq. (8) with
simulated curve for θ = 0. For correlated users, we compare theoretical curve in Eq. (9) with
simulated curve for θ = 1. We see that the simulated and theoretical curves match pretty well.
Now, when we look at the Stackelberg equilibrium in Fig. 4, it is clearly illustrated that the
theoretical upper-bounds derived in Eq. (8) and Eq. (9) turn out to be greater than the simulated
probabilities of no orthogonalization, which confirms the accuracy of the results. Remember that
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the theoretical curves derived in Eq. (8) and Eq. (9) correspond to the exact probability of no
orthogonalization in the simultaneous-move game, but are only upper-bounds in the hierarchical
version of the model, which is clearly confirmed by Fig. 3 and 4.
Fig. 5 and 6 depict the probability of no orthogonalization for different schemes considering
independent users (i.e., for θ = 0) and correlated users (i.e., for θ = 1) respectively. Both
curves follow the same trend, tending to increase the orthogonalization between the users as
the number of carriers grows, which validates the obtained theoretical results. A rather significant
gap between Nash and Stackelberg curves suggests that introducing hierarchy results in much
more orthogonalization between the players. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that, at the social
optimum, we always obtain strict orthogonalization between users. This means that, in a centralized
system, if maximizing the energy efficiency is the goal, introducing hierarchy moves the solution
closer to the social optimum.
To sum it up, we can argue that correlation across carriers is a suitable feature as it brings
more orthogonalization (and thus leads to a better spectral efficiency), desirable from the social
point of view, while correlation across users is not suited as it increases the probability of no
orthogonalization. This results is of practical interest as it suggests that designing the power
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control for multi-carrier networks shall be developed tailored to the physical properties of the
transmission phenomenon.
B. Energy efficiency
We then resort to plot the average energy efficiency at the equilibrium for increasing number
of carriers K. The curves obtained in Fig. 7 for independent users (i.e., for θ = 0) exhibit a
different trend than ones in Fig. 8 for correlated users (i.e., for θ = 1). Indeed, we remark that the
Stackelberg perform almost the same as the Nash game for θ = 0, whereas, for θ = 1, the gap
between the Nash game and the Stackelberg game increases. More specifically, the Stackelberg
model achieves an energy efficiency gain up to 25% with respect to the Nash model for K = 4
carriers. As the number of carriers K goes large, both configurations tend towards having the
same average energy efficiency. This can be justified by the fact that, when the number of carriers
increases, the probability that users transmit on different carriers is high (see Section V-A1) and
thus, users are less sensitive to their degree of hierarchy in the system (see Prop. 9). Interestingly,
in both the independent and correlated users’ cases, the Stackelberg game achieves almost the
same energy efficiency as at the social welfare, which tends to validate results in Prop. 9.
Fig. 9 illustrates the per-user energy efficiency with independent users. Interestingly, we see from
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Fig. 9 that, at the Stackelberg equilibrium, the energy efficiency of the follower in the Stackelberg
game is smaller than in the simultaneous-move game. This suggests that, for the vast majority
of cases, Situation 3) in Prop. 7 is more likely to occur for a low number of carriers K. As K
increases, Situation 1) in Prop. 7 is more likely to occur yielding the same energy efficiency for
both the leader and the follower in the Stackelberg game as in the simultaneous-move game. This
is justified by the fact that, with probability 1/K, resp. (K − 1)/K, users have the same, resp.
different, best channels. It is then easy to see that, for low K, users are more likely to have the
same best channels and interference is an issue in this case yielding to Situation 3) in Prop. 7,
whereas, for sufficiently large K, users are more likely to have different best channels yielding
to Situation 1) in Prop. 7. Moreover, Fig. 9 also shows that it is profitable to be the leader which
corresponds to what Prop. 8 points out.
C. Spectral efficiency
In Fig. 10 and 11, we compare the closed-form expressions of the spectral efficiency derived in
Eq. (10) for i.i.d. users (i.e., for θ = 0) and in Eq. (11) for correlated users (i.e., for θ = 1) with
the simulated spectral efficiency. Of particular interest is the fact that the closed-form expressions
turn out to be very tight. We can also observe that the Stackelberg game performs better than
the Nash game in terms of average spectral efficiency particularly for correlated users while still
performing very close to the social welfare. As an example, for K = 2 carriers, the Stackelberg
game yields only a negligible spectral efficiency loss 0.05 bps/Hz with respect to the social welfare
and approximately 0.22 bps/Hz of spectral efficiency gain beyond the Nash game.
D. Spectral efficiency – Energy efficiency Tradeoff
In order to illustrate the balance between the achievable rate and energy consumption of the
system, we plot in Fig. 12 and 13 the spectral efficiency as a function of the energy efficiency for
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independent and correlated users respectively. Surprisingly, it is clearly shown that, for both the
independent and correlated cases, the proposed Stackelberg decision approach achieves a flexible
and desirable tradeoff between energy efficiency and throughput maximization compared to the
social welfare and the Nash model. In particular, it is shown that the Stackelberg scheme maximizes
the energy efficiency while still optimizing the spectral efficiency at the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Notice that this contrasts with most related works so far in which the optimal energy efficiency
performance often leads to low spectral efficiency performance and vice versa [35]–[38]. This
feature has a great impact on the network performance and provides a convincing argument that
hierarchical communication is the proper context to design and optimize energy efficient wireless
networks.
VII. CONCLUSION
The growing interest in energy efficient research from signal processing and communication
communities has spurred an increasing interest in the recent years. There have been a large number
of proposals for all communication layers, but the system infrastructure has not been clearly
defined. In this paper, we have proposed a hierarchical game to model distributed joint power and
channel allocation for multi-carrier energy efficient systems since it has the advantage of leading
towards more realistic or even simpler distributed power control algorithms. We have established
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the existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium and gave its formal expression. The proposed scheme
achieves better performances as compared to those of other existing schemes, notably the Nash
model proposed in [5]. In particular, we have proved that introducing hierarchy across users
induces a spectrum orthogonalization which substantially improves system performances. For
the first time, we have derived the spectral efficiency of such a model with exact expressions
for the throughput scaling. The proposed scheme can achieve a spectral efficiency scaling of
log2(1+γ
∗)
[
1−O(K−(1+γ∗))], while a vanishing fraction of the carriers may suffer from mutual
interference as the number of the carriers goes large. Simulation results have been presented
to exhibit the effectiveness of the proposed scheme to balance the achievable rate and energy
consumption of the system.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 2
Lemma 1. For any finite sequence of n pairs (ak, bk) such that ak ≥ 0 and bk > 0 the following
inequality is true: ∑K
k=1 ak∑K
k=1 bk
≤ max{ak
bk
, k = 1, . . . , n}.
The equality is only possible if each ratio ak
bk
is equal.
Proof: We proceed by induction with respect to n. For n = 2, let us assume that the hypothesis
is not true and thus:
a1 + a2
b1 + b2
>
a1
b1
and a1 + a2
b1 + b2
>
a2
b2
.
This can be rewritten as
a1b1 + a2b1 > a1b1 + a1b2 and a1b2 + a2b2 > a2b1 + a2b2
or equivalently a2b1 > a1b2 > a2b1, which is a contradiction.
Next, assume that our hypothesis is true for any l < K. Then, we can proceed as follows:
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∑K
k=1 ak∑K
k=1 bk
≤
∑K−1
k=1 ak + aK∑K−1
k=1 bk + bK
≤ max
{∑K
k=1 ak∑K
k=1 bk
,
aK
bK
}
≤ max
{
max{ak
bk
, k = 1, . . . ,K − 1}, aK
bK
}
= max{ak
bk
, k = 1, . . . ,K}
If there is at least one pair (ak, bk), whose ratio is bigger than the other ones we can show along
the same lines that the inequality is strong (we only need to take these ak and bk from the sums∑K
k=1 ak,
∑K
k=1 bk in the above considerations instead of aK and bK .
Now we can prove Proposition 2.
Proof: Note that by Lemma 1
u1(p1, p2) =
∑K
k=1R1f(γ
k
1 )∑K
k=1 p
k
1
≤ max
k
R1f(γ
k
1 )
pk1
,
so the leader in the Stackelberg game cannot use more than one carrier simultaneously, as de-
creasing power to zero on every carrier different from the one realizing maximum above would
be beneficial. Thus he will choose only one carrier for which
fˆk1 (p
k
1) =
f(γk1 )
pk1
=
1
pk1
f(
gk1p
k
1
σ2 + gk2p
k
2(p1)
)
(where pk2 is computed according to (3)) is the greatest. Note however that since the follower will
chose only one carrier, fˆk1 (pk1) will be equal to
f(
gk1p
k
1
σ2(1+γ∗)+γ∗gk1p
k
1
)
pk1
only for one carrier, say carrier
k∗, and for any other carrier it will be equal to f(
gk1 p
k
1
σ2
)
pk1
, which is maximized for pk1 = γ
∗σ2
gk1
and then
equal to f(γ
∗)gk1
γ∗σ2
. But this last value depends on the carrier only through gk1 , so will be maximized
for k = B1 if only k∗ 6= B1. Thus the equilibrium strategy of the leader will put all the power
on carrier B1 in that case. If k∗ = B1, then the biggest value of fˆk1 (pk1) for k 6= k∗ will be for
k = S1, and either all the power of the leader will be put on this carrier or on k∗ = B1.
As for the follower, by Proposition 1 his best response is always to put all his power on the
carrier maximizing hˆk2(pk1) =
gk2
σ2+gk1p
k
1
, which will be equal to g
k
2
σ2
for all but one carrier. Now the
reasoning made for the leader can be applied here as well.
B. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: First consider the case when B1 6= B2. The biggest possible value of the ratio f(γkn)pkn
obtainable for player n on a single carrier (when his opponent does not maximize his payoff, but
also the payoff of player n) is f(γ∗)Rn
γ∗σ2
maxk g
k
n =
f(γ∗)Rn
γ∗σ2
gBnn . Just this is obtained by both players
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when they apply strategies pn defined in the theorem. Thus none of them will be interested in
changing his strategy.
Now we move to the case when B1 = B2. Suppose the leader uses only carrier B1 in his
equilibrium strategy. Then, by Proposition 2 the follower uses one of carriers B1 = B2 or S2. If
he uses B1 then by Proposition 1 the following has to be true:
hˆB12 (p
B1
1 ) =
gB12
σ2 + gB11 p
B1
1
≥ g
S2
2
σ2
= hˆS22 (p
S2
1 ).
Rewriting this we obtain that the follower chooses B1 when
pB11 ≤
σ2(gB12 − gS22 )
gB11 g
S2
2
(12)
and S2 otherwise. Having this in mind, we can compute the utility of the leader at the equilibrium
using carrier B1, namely
R1
f(
g
B1
1 p
B1
1
σ2(1+γ∗)+γ∗g
B1
1 p
B1
1
)
pB11
(13)
when pB11 ≤ σ
2(g
B1
2 −g
S2
2 )
g
B1
1 g
S2
2
and
R1
f(
g
B1
1 p
B1
1
σ2
)
pB11
(14)
otherwise. Next we need to find the values of pB11 maximizing (13) and (14) respectively. Before
we obtain the first one we rewrite the SINR in that case in the following way:
γB11 =
1
γ∗

1− 1
1 +
γ∗g
B1
1 p
B1
1
σ2(1+γ∗)

 (15)
and differentiate it with respect to pB11 , obtaining:
∂γB11
∂pB11
=
gB11
σ2(1 + γ∗)(1 + γ
∗
σ2(1+γ∗)
gB11 p
B1
1 )
2
(16)
=
gB11 σ
2(1 + γ∗)
(σ2(1 + γ∗) + γ∗gB11 p
B1
1 )
2
=
1
pB11
σ2(1 + γ∗)
gB11 p
B1
1 γ
∗ (γ
B1
1 )
2γ∗
Next, we can transform (15) into
γ∗gB11 p
B1
1
σ2(1 + γ∗)
=
γ∗γB11
1− γ∗γB11
. (17)
and put it into (16), obtaining:
∂γB11
∂pB11
=
1
pB11
1− γ∗γB11
γ∗γB11
(γB11 )
2γ∗ =
1
pB11
(γB11 − γ∗(γB11 )2). (18)
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Now we write the first order condition for the maximization of (13):
0 =
∂(
R1f(γ
B1
1 )
p
B1
1
)
∂pB11
= R1
−f(γB11 ) + f ′(γB11 )∂γ
B1
1
∂p
B1
1
pB11
(pB11 )
2
.
If we substitute (18) into it, we obtain the following equation:
− f(γB11 ) + (γB11 − γ∗(γB11 )2)f ′(γB11 ). (19)
If we find the best solution to this equation (that is, maximizing f(γ
B1
1 )
p
B1
1
), β∗, we get the power
allocation of the leader in case (12), which can be computed from (17) as
p∗∗ =
β∗σ2(1 + γ∗)
gB11 (1− γ∗β∗)
. (20)
Similarly, when we write the first order condition for the maximization of (14), we obtain
0 =
∂(
R1f(γ
B1
1 )
p
B1
1
)
∂pB11
=
−f(γB11 ) + γB11 f ′(γB11 )
(pB11 )
2
,
whose unique solution is γ∗. The corresponding value of pB11 is
p∗ =
γ∗σ2
gB11
. (21)
Now, we put (20) and (21) in (13) and (14) respectively, obtaining the value functions corresponding
to p∗ and p∗∗:
VB1 =
f(β∗)(1 − γ∗β∗)gB11 R1
β∗σ2(1 + γ∗)
and UB1 =
f(γ∗)gB11 R1
γ∗σ2
Note that the first one is always smaller than the second one (because γ∗ maximizes the ratio
f(x)
x
and γ∗, β∗ > 0). So, in case p∗ satisfies the condition opposite to (12), the leader will choose
to transmit on B1 with this power, while the follower will choose (according to (1)) to transmit
on S2 with power γ
∗σ2
g
S2
2
.
Next, when p∗ satisfies (12), the situation becomes more complex. The leader has to choose
between one of the three possibilities: to choose the power p∗∗ on carrier B1, giving him the value
of VB1 , to choose power pˆ = γˆσ
2
g
B1
1
on carrier B1, which now gives the biggest value in case the
follower chooses to use carrier S2, WB1 =
f(γˆ)g
B1
1 R1
γˆσ2
, or to choose to use his second-best carrier
S1 instead of B1, with power pS1 = γ
∗σ2
g
S1
1
, which would give him the value US1 =
f(γ∗)g
S1
1 R1
γ∗σ2
.
Choosing the biggest one from VB1 , WB1 and US1 will give the leader’s equilibrium payoff (and
corresponding equilibrium strategy) in the Stackelberg game, unless VB1 is not the biggest value
obtainable by the leader in case (12). This is only possible when the biggest value of (13) is
obtained on one of the ends of the interval (0, γˆ
1+γ∗(1+γˆ)
]. Thus, we compute these two values:
V 0B1 = limγ→0
R1f(γ)(1− γ∗γ)gB11
γσ2(1 + γ∗)
=
R1f
′(0)gB11
σ2(1 + γ2)
,
28
V 1B1 =
R1f(
γˆ
1+γ∗(1+γˆ)
)(1− γ∗ γˆ
1+γ∗(1+γˆ)
)gB11
γˆ
1+γ∗(1+γˆ)
σ2(1 + γ∗)
= R1
f( γˆ
1+γ∗(1+γˆ)
)gB11
γˆσ2
V 1B1 is clearly smaller than WB1 , so it cannot be the biggest value obtained by the leader. The
value V 0B1 though can be the biggest one, and so in case V
0
B1
is bigger than max{VB1,WB1 , US1}
it is optimal for the leader to use the smallest power possible on carrier B1 (which is not an
equilibrium strategy, as for any arbitrarily small power there exists a smaller power, for which the
value function of the leader is closer to V 0B1 . The power allocations of the follower in each of the
cases of (12) are computed according to Proposition 1.
C. Proof of Proposition 4
Proof: The inequality (6) is a rewriting of the condition V 0B1 > max{VB1,WB1 , US1}, appear-
ing in the proof of Theorem 2, where the optimal behavior of the leader in the case when this
condition, together with B1 = B2 and γˆ > γ∗ is satisfied, was also described. The behavior of the
follower follows from Proposition 1.
D. Proof of Proposition 5
Proof: By Proposition 3, no orthogonalization between the players is only possible if B1 = B2,
γˆ > γ∗ (22)
and
max{V 0B1 , VB1} > max{WB1 , US1}. (23)
(22) can be rewritten as g
B2
2 −g
S2
2
g
S2
2
> γ∗, which is then equivalent to gB22 > (1 + γ∗)gS22 . On
the other hand (23) implies that V 0B1 > US1 , which can be written as
f ′(0)g
B1
1
1+γ∗
>
f(γ∗)g
S1
1
γ∗
. Now,
using the definition of γ∗ and the fact that f ′(0) < f ′(γ∗) (see [28]) we can conclude that
f ′(γ∗)g
B1
1
1+γ∗
> f ′(γ∗)gS11 , which implies gB11 > (1 + γ∗)gS11 , ending the proof.
E. Proof of Proposition 6
Proof: By Proposition 5, no orthogonalization is only possible if B1 = B2 and gBnn ≥
(1+γ∗)gSnn for n = 1, 2 (which is an exact condition for no orthogonalization in the simultaneous-
move model). The probability of this can be computed as
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1−
[
K − 1
K
+
P
K
+
1− P
K
P
K
]
=
1− P
K
(
1− P
K
)
. (24)
where P denotes the probability that for one of the players gBii < (1 + γ∗)gSii . We can easily
compute that
P = K!
∫
∞
0
dgKi
∫
∞
gK
i
dgK−1i . . .
∫
∞
g3
i
dg2i
∫ (1+γ∗)g2i
g2
i
λKe−λ
∑K
k=1 g
k
i dg1i .
If we introduce new variables x1 = λ(g1i − g2i ), x2 = λ(g2i − g3i ), . . ., xK−1 = λ(gK−1i − gki ),
xK = λgKi , we can write it as
K!
∫
∞
0
dxK
∫
∞
0
dxK−1 . . .
∫
∞
0
dx2
∫ γ∗ ∑Kk=2 xk
0
e−
∑
K
k=1
kxkdx1
and further as 1 − K!
(2+γ∗)...(K+γ∗)
. If we substitute it into the bound of no orthogonalization
probability (24), we obtain
(K − 1)!
(2 + γ∗) . . . (K + γ∗)
(
K − 1
K
+
(K − 1)!
(2 + γ∗) . . . (K + γ∗)
)
= (1 + γ∗)B(1 + γ∗, K)
[
K − 1
K
+ (1 + γ∗)B(1 + γ∗, K)
]
.
It can be immediately seen that this is no less than (1 + γ∗)B(1 + γ∗, K). The fact that this last
quantity is O(K−(1+γ∗)) is well known (see e.g., pp. 263 in [39]).
F. Proof of Proposition 7
Proof: First note that the players in the Stackelberg game both use carrier B1 = B2 in
(ǫ-)equilibrium when g
B1
1
g
S1
1
and g
B2
2
g
S2
2
satisfy
max
{
f(β∗)(1 − γ∗β∗)
β∗(1 + γ∗)
,
f ′(0)
1 + γ∗
}
g
B1
1
g
S1
1
>
f(γ∗)
γ∗
, (25)
max
{
f(β∗)(1 − γ∗β∗)
β∗(1 + γ∗)
,
f ′(0)
1 + γ∗
}
>
f(
g
B2
2
g
S2
2
− 1)
g
B2
2
g
S2
2
− 1
, (26)
which is true for g
B1
1
g
S1
1
and g
B2
2
g
S2
2
big enough (where the latter is a consequence of the fact that the
RHS of (26) converges to 0 as g
B2
2
g
S2
2
goes to infinity). If we intersect the set obtained with the set
where g
B1
1
g
S1
1
and g
B2
2
g
S2
2
are bigger than 1
1−γ∗ we get the desired set where there is no orthogonalization
in equilibria of both the Stackelberg and simultaneous-move games.
Now let us compute the payoffs of the follower in this situation. The payoff in the simultaneous-
move game equals f(γ
∗)g
B2
2 (1−γ∗)R2
γ∗σ2
, while that in the Stackelberg game is f(γ
∗)g
B2
2 (1−γ∗β∗)R2
γ∗σ2(1+β∗)
. The
latter is bigger if 1 − γ∗ < 1−γ∗β∗
1+β∗
, which is equivalent to γ∗ > β∗. This is always true, as any
solution to (5) has to be smaller than γ∗.
Next, suppose that g
B1
1
g
S1
1
< 1 + γ∗ and g
B2
2
g
S2
2
> 1 + γ∗, and thus player 1 uses carrier S1, while
player 2 uses carrier B2 in the only equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game. Then, to obtain
the situation where it is player 1 who uses his best carrier and player 2 who uses his second-best
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one in the Stackelberg game, the inequality
f(
g
B2
2
g
S2
2
−1)
g
B2
2
g
S2
2
−1
g
B1
1
g
S1
1
> f(γ
∗)
γ∗
has to be true. If we denote by
y(x) the solution5 of the equation f(x−1)
x−1 y(x) =
f(γ∗)
γ∗
, we may rewrite the above three inequalities
as
y(
gB22
gS22
) <
gB11
gS11
< 1 + γ∗,
gB22
gS22
> 1 + γ∗. (27)
Now note that since the function f is sigmoidal, f(x−1)
x−1 strictly decreases on the set x > 1+ γ
∗
.
Combining this with the fact that f((1+γ
∗)−1)
(1+γ∗)−1
1
1
= f(γ
∗)
γ∗
, one can see that for x > 1 + γ∗ the curve
y(x) is strictly increasing, and thus the set of pairs ( g
B1
1
g
S1
1
,
g
B2
2
g
S2
2
) satisfying (27) is not empty.
The payoffs of the follower in the simultaneous-move game and Stackelberg game (respectively)
are in this situation f(γ
∗)g
B2
2 R2
γ∗σ2
and f(γ
∗)g
S2
2 R2
γ∗σ2
. Clearly the former is greater than the latter.
The final case is obvious, as in case when B1 6= B2 the strategies the players use are the same
in the simultaneous-move and Stackelberg games.
G. Proof of Proposition 8
Proof: To prove this prop., we only need to compare the utilities for player 1 when he is the
leader and when he is the follower in each of the cases of Prop. 3.
H. Proof of Proposition 9
Proof: The first part of the proposition is obvious. To prove 1) of the second part first note that
the social welfare in equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game can only be bigger than that in
Stackelberg equilibrium when the payoff of the follower in the Stackelberg game decreases. This is
only possible when the carrier he uses in equilibrium changes from B1 = B2 in the simultaneous-
move game to S2 in the Stackelberg game. In such a case his utility changes from f(γ
∗)g
B2
2 R2
γ∗σ2
to
f(γ∗)g
S2
2 R2
γ∗σ2
if the leader also changes the carrier he uses from S1 to B1 or from f(γ
∗)(1−γ∗)gB22 R2
γ∗σ2
to
f(γ∗)g
S2
2 R2
γ∗σ2
if the leader uses carrier B1 in both simultaneous-move and Stackelberg equilibria. On
the other hand the utility of the leader in the Stackelberg equilibrium is f(γ
∗)g
B1
1 R1
γ∗σ2
in the former
case and not smaller than f(γ
∗)(1−γ∗)gB11 R1
γ∗σ2
in the latter one (this is because this is his utility in
Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game, and the utility of the leader increases in Stackelberg
game). Straightforward computations yield the desired bound on the decrease of social welfare.
5It follows from the fact that f(x)
x
is decreasing for x > 1 + γ∗ that there is always only one such y.
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To prove part 2) first note that the maximum utility that can be obtained in this game is bounded
above by
f(γ∗)gB11 R1
γ∗σ2
+
f(γ∗)gB22 R2
γ∗σ2
, (28)
as this is the sum of maximal utilities of both players (but not obtainable at the same time if
B1 = B2). Next note that if the leader uses carrier S1 in Stackelberg equilibrium, the sum of
the utilities of both players is f(γ
∗)g
S1
1 R1
γ∗σ2
+
f(γ∗)g
B2
2 R2
γ∗σ2
,
R1g
B1
1 +R2g
B2
2
R1g
S1
1 +R2g
B2
2
<
R1g
B1
1 +R2g
B2
2
R1g
S1
1 +R2g
S2
2
times less than
(28). On the other hand if he uses B1 in Stackelberg equilibrium, his utility cannot be smaller
than f(γ
∗)g
S1
1 R1
γ∗σ2
, while that of the follower not less than f(γ
∗)g
S2
2 R2
γ∗σ2
(if they were not, each of them
would change his carrier to S1 or S2). But the sum of these utilities is R1g
B1
1 +R2g
B2
2
R1g
S1
1 +R2g
S2
2
times less than
(28).
I. Proof of Proposition 10
Proof: No orthogonalization in the simultaneous-move game is possible exactly when B1 =
B2 and gBnn ≥ (1+γ∗)gSnn for n = 1, 2. 1 minus the exact probability of that region is computed in
Proposition 6, and this is also the lower bound on the same probability for the Stackelberg game.
The spectral efficiency in case there is orthogonalization between the players can be computed
as the expected value of log2(1 + γ) over this region. Note however that γ ≡ γ∗ there, and so
the bound on spectral efficiency is exactly log2(1 + γ∗) times (the bound on) the probability of
orthogonalization, which is 1− (1 + γ∗)B(1 + γ∗, K) [K−1
K
+ (1 + γ∗)B(1 + γ∗, K)].
